Elusive Hopes of Land Reparations in Yemen

Since the conclusion of the Comprehensive National Dialogue in Yemen, the priorities of transitional justice have been submerged under the seemingly intractable conflicts, particularly those resulting from the Houthi insurgence and the expanding war involving the neighboring countries. Among the hopeful signs one year ago was the clarity and seriousness of the outcomes of the Dialogue emphasizing land and property issues. Namely, the special commissions addressing the issues of Sa`da, violation against the South and the wider Transitional Justice Commission identified land and property restoration as urgent priority to achieve justice for victims and national reconciliation.

At the same time, HIC-HLRN has been working with local Members and researcher under its project “Supporting Land Reparations as an Element of Transitional Justice in Yemen.” It is no small coincidence that the Houthi uprising was sparked, in part, by the previous regime’s grabbing of tribal lands in the Houthis’ own territory of Sa`da.

The now-stalled transition process and the pursuit of justice were complex and fraught with numerous challenges from the start. From the HIC-HLRN workshop, launching the local research in November 2014, participants identified the various obstacles to the reparation process. They cited these as:

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  Political, security and administrative challenges: the large number ofcriminals andvictims, the weakness ofthe judicialstaff, both in their inefficiency and insufficient number (2,700 judge of the members of the prosecution at the level of the Republic);

• The absence ofofficialandcivil institutionsthat canbe relied upon inreparationsprocess;

• Citizen’s general inexperience and fear ofparticipation;

• The absence of the government )executive ; legislative and judicial branches);

• The weakness prospectsfor the providing financial compensation;

• The limited capacity of individuals to mount and pursue law suits;

• The state`s weakness at enforcing judicial decisions and political interference in carrying them out;

• The dominance of the executive over the rest of the legislative and judicial branches;

• Frequent conflict on land (multiplicity of conflicting parties; state and tribes, and citizens, etc.);

• The absence of complete data and information about violations;

• Random construction and its impact on restitution and/or compensation;

• The exchange of roles between the victim and the perpetrator of the violation by virtue of successive rounds of conflict;

• Flawed legislative system;

• Inability to seek redress from legalized forms of confiscations (e.g., in Taiz, Ra’s `Isa,Hudaydah, Aden Free Zone and other cases);

• The absence of a clear roadmap for the application of transitional justice;

• Decline of transitional justice in the national reconciliation process (favoring the partners of the previous regime);

• Lack of clarity on the expected role of the transitional justice institutions, (civil society, the Ministry of Legal Affairs, Presidency, etc.);

• The absence of the mechanisms necessary for the implementation of transitional justice;

• Those implicated in the chaos and violations of the past are currently serving in public office;

• Non-inclusion in the current transitional justice law on the restitution of rights with respect to land;

• Problematic committees addressing issues of land in the South and Tihama;

• The difficulty of obtaining information and data collection, due to security and political conditions, and the absence of state authority to protect the researchers and data collectors.

These initial challenges remain as hurdles in any transitional justice process toward reparation of land and property under the ancien regime. New and accumulated violations and another generation of victims are arising daily from the current militarized conflict only dim the prospects of justice. In order to refocus Yemenis vision of transitional justice first requires an end to the fighting.